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Attenuating indigenous property rights:
land policy after the Wik decision
{
David Godden*
In December 1996, the High Court of Australia handed down its judgement in
the Wik case ¢nding, by a 4:3 majority, that pastoral leases did not necessarily
extinguish native title. An intense political campaign by both pastoral and
indigenous interests, and their political representatives, was aimed, in the case of
the former, at legislative extinguishment of native title on pastoral leases and, in
the case of the latter, at defending property rights which the High Court found had
never been extinguished. In this article it is argued that an e¤cient re-allocation
of property rights is unlikely to result from extinguishment, but requires Coasian-
type bargains between pastoral and indigenous interests.
1. Introduction
On 23 December 1996, the Australian High Court handed down its
judgement in the Wik case. The Court decided, by a 4:3 majority that native
title might not have been extinguished by the grant and operation of pastoral
leases.
1 Further, the Court decided that in some circumstances pastoral
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1The majority in Mabo comprised Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan and
McHugh, Justices Deane and Gaudron, and Justice Toohey; Justice Dawson dissented. The
majority in Wik comprised Justices Toohey, Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby (all individual
judgements); Chief Justice Brennan and Justices Dawson and McHugh dissented. By mid-
1998 Chief Justice Brennan, and Justices Dawson and Toohey, had retired. The next major
native title case is therefore likely to be heard by at most two High Court judges (Gaudron
and McHugh) who heard the original Mabo case.leases and native title might coexist. The purpose of this article is initially
to brie£y review the native title background to the Wik case ö the Mabo
case and the Commonwealth's 1993 Native Title Act (NTA). The broad
economic context of the High Court's Wik decision is then evaluated,
followed by an evaluation of the Commonwealth's amended 10 point plan.
2. Mabo and the Native Title Act
2
The High Court's decision in the Mabo case of 3 June 1992 re-asserted
indigenous common law rights to title in land (Mabo and Others v State of
Queensland; Mabo 1992). The central issue in the judgement was that `the
High Court of Australia held in Mabo v Queensland that the common law of
Australia recognises a form of native title' (anon. 1992, para. 1). The case
was common law, i.e. judge-made law rather than parliamentary statute, and
thus not based on interpretation of statute or the Commonwealth
Constitution. The decision was controversial because many Australians
believed indigenous Australians had never owned land in a way recognised
by English law and, further, even if indigenous Australians ever had owned
their land they had long since lost possession by `settlement' or `conquest'.
The Mabo decision arose in the speci¢c context of the claim by three Torres
Strait Islanders ö Eddie Mabo, David Passi and James Rice ö for a
declaration that they be recognised as the owners of their traditional lands.
In the course of examining this particular case, the Court reviewed general
principles underlying native title in Australia generally, thus a¡ecting both
Torres Strait Islanders and Aborigines. Approximately 9 square kilometres
were granted to the claimants by the Mabo decision. The High Court's
decision prompted both federal and state governments to legislate for
indigenous land rights. The approach of the Western Australian government
was inconsistent with that of the federal government and the former,
together with South Australia, challenged the federal legislation in the High
Court; this challenge was dismissed in March 1995.
The majority of judges decided that `upon the acquisition of
sovereignty by the Crown it acquired a ªradical'' title to the land' but
that this `ªRadical'' title was subject to existing native title the elements
of which are to be determined according to the traditional laws and
customs of those people with whom the title resides' (anon. 1992,
Appendix, paras. 2^3,4).
3 The Court thus `rejected the notion that
2The ¢rst part of this section is drawn from Godden (1997, pp. 281^300).
3The Mabo judgement was also well summarised by the Chief Justice in Wik (Wik 1996,
per Brennan; see Appendix).
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European settlement and the resulting implication that the absolute
ownership of land vested in the Crown' (ibid., Appendix, para. 2).
However, `The High Court's rejection of the proposition that Australia
was terra nullius at the time of settlement does not mean that indigenous
Australians can claim sovereignty under international law' (ibid.,
Appendix, para. 41). The Crown's sovereignty did confer title for `those
areas of the continent that were ªtruly uninhabited''' (ibid., Appendix,
para. 4).
4 While the Crown obtained sovereignty, `the acquisition of
sovereignty did not itself e¡ect the automatic extinguishment of native
title, where it existed, although certain actions by governments or the loss
[by indigenous Australians] of a traditional connection with the land . . .
will have extinguished the [native] title in respect of particular areas'
(ibid., Appendix, para. 4).
The majority of judges accepted that extinguishment of native title resulted
from grant of freehold title (anon. 1992, Appendix, para. 10), although the
judges di¡ered over what other actions might have extinguished this title
(ibid., Appendix, para. 11). Where native title possibly exists, its continued
existence partly depended on `whether an interest in the land granted by the
Crown, or the Crown's actions as an occupier, were inconsistent with the
continuing right to enjoy native title, and therefore extinguished that title'
(ibid., Appendix, para. 11). Judges' views also varied as to whether or not
native title was extinguished by grants of leasehold (ibid., Appendix, para.
12). The Crown's appropriation of land for an existing use probably
extinguished native title ö `roads, railways and buildings, such as post
o¤ces, were mentioned' ö but appropriation for some future use would not
extinguish native title (ibid., Appendix, para. 13). Land set aside for a
national park or wasteland might not extinguish native title, whereas
declaration of a wilderness area might be inconsistent with continuing native
title (ibid., Appendix, para. 13). `Native title might not have been
extinguished by the granting of authorities to prospect for minerals', but a
mining lease probably would (ibid., Appendix, paras. 14, 19).
While the direct intent of the Mabo judgement a¡ected land title, the
generic resource `land' has many economic dimensions. From the Court's
judgement, it was unclear as to `whether the scope of any title might extend
to the natural resources of the land, including minerals' or whether native
title rights might have only been restricted to resources traditionally used by
indigenous Australians (anon. 1992, Appendix, para. 20). For example,
4Native title claims would probably never be denied because the land in question was
`truly uninhabited' since, at the time of the settlement in Sydney in 1788, it was unknown
whether or not areas other than Sydney's immediate vicinity were actually uninhabited.
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held `The nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter
of fact by reference to the traditional laws acknowledged by and the
traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants' (Mabo 1992, p.2
(iv) and p.42). Justices Deane and Gaudron argued that `The traditional
law and custom is not, however, frozen as at the moment of the
establishment of a Colony' (Mabo 1992, p.83; cf. Brennan et al. in Mabo
1992, p. 44). It was thus unclear whether or not native title only granted
rights to exploit resources with traditional technologies (anon. 1992,
Appendix, para. 28). Other issues not directly canvassed in the Mabo
judgement included whether or not native title extended to water resources
(surface, sub-surface, marine), littoral (foreshores, beaches, sea-bed), or
¢sheries (e.g. ibid., Appendix, paras. 6, 19^25).
5
The general e¡ects of the Mabo decision are summarised in ¢gure 1. Land
where contemporary indigenous people had no continuing and traditional
association had had its native title extinguished (second row of ¢gure 1).
Land which had been dealt with so that its use was inconsistent with native
title, e.g. freehold land (which explicitly granted exclusive possession), also
had had its native title extinguished (second cell of ¢gure 1). Native title has
also been extinguished on non-alienated (i.e. `Crown') land with a dedicated
use (third sub-cell of cell 1). Opportunities existed for potentially successful
native title on vacant Crown land without a dedicated use (¢rst sub-cell of
cell 1). The status of pastoral leasehold land (second sub-cell of cell 1 in
¢gure 1) was unclear, partly because there was no such land on the Murray
Islands.
Despite populist views to the contrary, the Mabo case did not grant land
rights to indigenous Australians.
6 It simply determined the circumstances
under which land had not been taken from them, i.e. where native title had
not been extinguished.
7 The case did not create new law, but revisited the
context in which Australian settlement had occurred and the way that land
5Native title over marine resources was found to exist in the Croker Island case (Mary
Yarmirr & Ors v The Northern Territory of Australia & Ors 1998). Other claims under the
Native Title Act have included claims for freshwater resources (Yorta Yorta claim)
(National Native Title Tribunal 1997a).
6`But it is important to understand that the decision in Mabo [No 2] was not a legislative
but a judicial act. It did not declare that thenceforth native title would be recognised. It held
that native title had always existed . . . It had survived the advent of the sovereignty of the
Crown in Australia'. (Wik 1996, per Kirby)
7Even as late as the ¢nal debate on the Native Title Amendment Bill in July 1998, a
government member railed against the original Mabo decision, calling for a referendum to
decide whether or not the Australian people wanted native title (Smith 1998, p. 6063).
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where expropriation had not occurred were identi¢ed in the judgement and,
therefore, the situations in which native title remained unviolated. Since
expropriation of resources, even with compensation, is unlikely to be Pareto
e¤cient, especially where there are non-marketed goods involved, the
Court's decision in Mabo (and the subsequent Native Title Act) was likely to
prevent future Pareto-ine¤cient seizures of indigenous Australians' land.
Following the Mabo decision, two broad strategies were open to
government. First, the decision could have been legislatively ignored, leaving
it up to the courts to determine in each particular instance whether or not
native title had been extinguished. Alternatively, governments could have
attempted to facilitate the process by creating a framework within which an
orderly process for determining native title claims could occur. Both
Commonwealth and State Governments opted for the latter course, with the
Commonwealth's Native Title Act receiving assent in late 1993 and
commencing on 1 January 1994.
8 The Native Title Act 1993 implemented the
High Court's decision by importing the relevant common law (French
1994). The political process of arriving at this Act was discussed in Godden
(1997, pp. 286^91).
By 4 August 1997, the National Native Title Tribunal, established to
facilitate claims for native title and declarations for its extinguishment had
dealt with 1342 claims (table 1). The ¢rst grant of native title was for 12.4
hectares of land at Crescent Head, NSW, which was immediately
Figure 1 Native title implications following Mabo
8Unless explicitly noted otherwise, any reference to a Native Title Act is to the
Commonwealth Act.
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110000 hectares at Hopevale on Cape York, mediated by the National
Native Title Tribunal (National Native Title Tribunal 1997b) and rati¢ed by
the Federal Court on 5 December 1997 (National Native Title Tribunal
1997c).
9
With respect to pastoral leases, both the Mabo decision and the NTA were
largely silent. Justice Toohey in the Wik case commented that:
The recital in the preamble to the Native Title Act that
`The High Court has: . . .
(c) held that native title is extinguished by valid government acts that
are inconsistent with the continued existence of native title rights
and interests, such as the grant of freehold or leasehold estates'
reads too much into the judgments in Mabo [No 2] so far as the reference
to leasehold estates is concerned unless particular attention is given to
what is meant by that term. At their highest, the references are obiter.
(Wik 1996, per Toohey)
Even before enactment of the Native Title Act, the Wik plainti¡s had begun
their action.
3. Wik decision
The majority judges in Wik, while each submitting individual reasonings,
jointly agreed to a common position in the case, which was presented as a
Table 1 Summary data of claims submitted to National Native Title Tribunal: all applications (as at 4
August 1997)
Accepted: 615 Accepted and
referred to the
Federal Court:
17 Rejected: 15 Withdrawn: 337
Not yet
accepted:
132 Dismissed: 59 Determined: 167 Total: 1342
Source: National Native Title Tribunal (1997)
9The slow evolution of native title grants since the High Court's Mabo decision may be
viewed through spectacles of various hues. It could be seen as indicating that non-indigenous
Australians have little to fear from native title. Alternatively, it could be seen as indicating
that the process established by the Native Title Act is too convoluted and thus ine¤cient in
delivering satisfactory outcomes.
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postscript are:
To say that the pastoral leases in question did not confer rights to
exclusive possession on the grantees is in no way destructive of the title of
those grantees. It is to recognise that the rights and obligations of each
grantee depend upon the terms of the grant of the pastoral lease and upon
the statute which authorised it.
So far as the extinguishment of native title rights is concerned, the
answer given is that there was no necessary extinguishment of those
rights by reason of the grant of pastoral leases under the Acts in
question. Whether there was extinguishment can only be determined by
reference to such particular rights and interests as may be asserted and
established. If inconsistency is held to exist between the rights and
interests conferred by native title and the rights conferred under the
statutory grants, those rights and interests must yield, to that extent, to
the rights of the grantees. Once the conclusion is reached that there is no
necessary extinguishment by reason of the grants, the possibility of the
existence of concurrent rights precludes any further question arising in
the appeals as to the suspension of any native title rights during the
currency of the grants.
(Wik 1996, per Toohey)
The key issue ö whether or not pastoral leases extinguished native title in
principle ö was argued in all judgements to require a determination of the
nature and incidents of pastoral leases, which could only be assessed in the
context of the historical development of pastoral leases in Australia, as this
tenure was unknown in English law. Chief Justice Brennan (with Justices
Dawson and McHugh concurring) argued, for example, that:
In the present case, it would be erroneous, after identifying the relevant
act as the grant of a pastoral lease under the 1910 Act to inquire whether
the grant of the lease exhibited a clear and plain intention to extinguish
native title. The question is not whether the Governor in Council intended
or exhibited an intention to extinguish native title but whether the right
to exclusive possession conferred by the leases on the pastoral lessees was
inconsistent with the continued right of the holders of native title to enjoy
that title.
(Wik 1996, per Brennan)
Because the Wik judgment turned on the nature and incidents of pastoral
leases, there is a review of the historical development of pastoral leases in
each of the judgments (cf. Reynolds 1992).
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10
Faced with the rapid spread of squatting in the NSW Colony, the colonial
legislature enacted the squatting acts which created pastoral licences.
11
Licensees were permitted to occupy non-European-settled land for a ¢xed
annual licence fee. The Crown Lands Unauthorized Occupation Act 1839
(NSW) established a border police for law enforcement beyond the settled
areas, and this Act clearly contemplated the co-existence of Aborigines
and squatters on these licensed lands. The Imperial Government's Sale of
Waste Lands Act Amendment Act 1846, implemented locally in 1847,
limited these licences to fourteen years, speci¢ed that they be for pastoral
purposes, and evidenced no intention to exclude Aborigines from such
lands. Justice Kirby (and other judges) quoted the following contemporary
despatch:
[I]t should be generally understood that Leases granted for this
purpose give the grantees only an exclusive right of pasturage for their
cattle, and of cultivating such Land as they may require within the
large limits thus assigned to them, but that these Leases are not
intended to deprive the Natives of their former right to hunt over
these Districts, or to wander over them in search of subsistence, in the
manner to which they have been heretofore accustomed, from the
spontaneous produce of the soil except over land actually cultivated or
fenced in for that purpose.
(quoted in Wik 1996, per Kirby)
When land settlement commenced in Moreton Bay (Queensland) in 1842, it
was part of the NSW Colony and NSW's laws thus applied, including those
relating to squatting. Following self-government in NSW in 1855, and in
Queensland in 1859, NSW's laws applied until repealed or modi¢ed.
Queensland `adopted and elaborated the form of pastoral lease which had
earlier evolved in New South Wales' (Wik 1996, per Kirby) with most of the
legislation containing `express provisions conferring rights on third parties
over a pastoral lease, inconsistent with the submission that the lease
10The ¢rst part of this brief history is drawn from Justice Kirby's judgement; the latter
from Justice Toohey's. See also Reynolds (1992).
11`It is useful to record, brie£y, something of the history of the emergence of pastoral
leases in Queensland. As a result of the di¡erent patterns of availability and utilisation of
land in England, such leases were unknown in that country. They are creatures of Australian
statutes.' (Wik 1996, per Kirby).
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Kirby).
12 In particular:
Nor did the legislation expressly provide for the curtailment or limitation
of Aboriginal rights, or any manner of dealing with the land from which
could be inferred the purpose of abolishing Aboriginal native title.
(Wik 1996, per Kirby).
Finally, the rights granted to pastoralists were granted for `pastoral purposes
only', without exclusive possession (Wik 1996, per Toohey).
13
In summary, therefore, the general state of pastoral leasehold tenure,
according to the High Court majority in Wik, was that pastoral leases did
not grant exclusive possession to the lessees. Indeed, both the pastoral
leasehold legislation and its administration contemplated the co-existence of
pastoral lessees and indigenous people.
12`None of the foregoing Queensland legislation expressly abolished Aboriginal native
title. This is scarcely surprising, having regard to the then understanding of the law, that
such title had not survived annexation of Australia to the Crown. Nor did the legislation
expressly provide for the curtailment or limitation of Aboriginal rights, or any manner of
dealing with the land from which could be inferred the purpose of abolishing Aboriginal
native title. Again, this is unsurprising, in light of the understanding of Aboriginal legal
rights at the time, the provisions in limited legislation about particular aspects of Aboriginal
policy and the then prevailing policy of ignoring Aboriginals, leaving them as far as possible
untouched by Australian law in the expectation, and hope, that they would become
ªcivilised'', assimilated or otherwise disappear as a ªproblem''.' (Wik 1996, per Kirby)
13`leases granted under the 1910 Act . . . were expressed to be for ªpastoral purposes
only''. ªPastoral purposes'' is not de¢ned in the Act nor are the grants of lease speci¢c as to
what the expression entails. Clearly it includes the raising of livestock. It also includes things
incidental thereto such as establishing fences, yards, bores, mills and accommodation for
those engaged in relevant activities. But the use to which the land may be put is
circumscribed by the expression ªpastoral purposes only''; the rights of the lessee are to be
determined accordingly.
`A pastoral lease under the relevant legislation granted to the lessee possession of the land
for pastoral purposes. And the grant necessarily gave to the lessee such possession as was
required for the occupation of the land for those purposes. As has been seen, each lease
contained a number of reservations of rights of entry, both speci¢c and general. The lessee's
right to possession must yield to those reservations. There is nothing in the statute which
authorised the lease, or in the lease itself, which conferred on the grantee rights to exclusive
possession, in particular possession exclusive of all rights and interests of the indigenous
inhabitants whose occupation derived from their traditional title. In so far as those rights
and interests involved going on to or remaining on the land, it cannot be said that the lease
conferred on the grantee rights to exclusive possession. That is not to say the legislature gave
conscious recognition to native title in the sense re£ected in Mabo [No 2]. It is simply that
there is nothing in the statute or grant that should be taken as a total exclusion of the
indigenous people from the land, thereby necessarily treating their presence as that of
trespassers or at best licensees whose licence could be revoked at any time.' (Wik 1996, per
Toohey)
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with statutory provision for access in Western Australia, South Australia
and the Northern Territory. In Western Australia, section 106 of the Land
Act 1993 (WA) provides:
The Aboriginal natives may at all times enter upon any unenclosed and
unimproved parts of the land the subject of a pastoral lease to seek their
sustenance in their accustomed manner.
(anon. 1994, p.106)
In South Australia, while there are some restrictions on habitation:
the Pastoral Land Management and Conservation Act 1989 (SA) provides
that an Aboriginal may enter, travel across or stay on pastoral land for
the purpose of following the traditional pursuits of the Aboriginal
people.
(anon. 1994, p.106)
In the Northern Territory, while there are some restrictions on where people
may reside and build permanent shelter:
section 38(2) of the Pastoral Land Act 1992 (NT) provides that where there
is a reservation in a pastoral lease in favour of the Aboriginal inhabitants
of the territory, it allows Aboriginals who ordinarily reside on the leased
land, or who by tradition are entitled to use or occupy the land, and
(subject to other laws) to kill wild animals and take natural vegetation for
food or ceremonial purposes.
(anon. 1994, p.106)
In NSW, there appears to be nothing in the Western Lands Act 1901 (as
amended) which exhibits `a clear and plain intention' to extinguish native
title in the sense indicated in Mabo. The existence of native title in NSW
therefore appears to require a search of whether such `a clear and plain
intention' was exhibited for individual leases, and whether or not Aborigines
maintained a continuing and traditional association with the land.
3.2 Depicting property rights in Wik
The property rights involved in the Wik case, and similar pastoral leases,
can be depicted via ¢gure 2. The outer circle represents the property right(s)
encompassing the total of all service £ows connected with all natural
resources associated with pastoral leases. The inner circle represents rights
conferred by the nature of pastoral lease. The ¢rst issue in Wik was ö did
the rights enjoyed by pastoralists exhaust the sum total of these rights? The
answer of the majority in Wik was `no'; there were `residual' rights additional
10 D. Godden
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for example, rights of traverse and mineral rights, in addition to any
indigenous peoples' rights. The second issue in Wik was ö given the
existence of these additional rights ö to whom did they belong? The Court's
decision was that, because these additional rights had never been alienated
by the Crown, and as long as their exercise did not con£ict with pastoralists'
rights, native title may still exist under principles established under Mabo of
continuing and traditional association of indigenous peoples with these
resources.
3.3 General observations
Pastoralists' representatives generally rejected the majority judgement in
Wik. For example, McDonald (1997a, emphasis added) argued:
14
All the position that I am putting is that title has been issued over leases
and over freehold and all sorts of other arrangements in Australia. They
were issued by the representatives of ourselves, by our Parliaments and we
believe that they were issued in total good faith to those people to have
exclusive occupancy of that land. . . . We believe that as the decision in
1993 believed, that native title was extinguished on pastoral leases. . . . We
as a nation have given those people that title, unencumbered, with total
freedom from intrusion by others.
This assertion, by the Federal President of the National Party of Australia,
may be seen as an ambit claim, or a statement of pastoralists' beliefs about
Figure 2 Depicting Wik
14See also: `Cries of indignant urban outrage that farmers' rights will be hugely expanded
in windfall freeholding and fears that they will run riot across the country with bulldozers,
clearing the path for myriad outback Disneylands have greeted the National Farmers'
Federation's request for restoration of farmers' pre-Wik rights.' (Craik 1997, emphasis
added)
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position.
The position apparently created by the Wik judgement, i.e. of potentially
co-existing access rights to natural resources, is not an unusual legal state.
Young (1992, ¢gure 4.1) depicted the concurrent rights that may exist
associated with natural resources. For example, mining tenements co-exist
with other titles (Nettheim 1997). An excellent, practical example is the
access of walkers in England and Wales to some 200000 kilometres of
pathways, much of it over alienated land, in an area somewhat smaller than
Victoria's (Riddall and Trevelyan 1992). Property rights are also frequently
restricted by covenants and easements.
In the aftermath of both Mabo and Wik decisions, there was much
contention that the decisions appeared to be aimed at righting past wrongs.
This assertion conveniently ignored that both decisions were aimed at
protecting the status quo with respect to native title, i.e. preventing the future
expropriation of native title land, rather than returning previously alienated
land to indigenous people. Ironically, however, even if the decisions had been
about righting past wrongs
15 by returning expropriated land, there was at
least one contemporary international case where the return of previously
expropriated land was actually occurring (i.e. in the former East Germany
where property con¢scated by the former communist government was being
restored to its previous owners by the government of the united Germany).
And certainly there were situations where indigenous Australians had had
their land, or access to their traditional lands, expropriated within a similar
time scale.
16
3.4 Uncertainty ö about what and for whom?
In early 1997, the Federal President of the National Party of Australia
commented: `that's what we've been asking for since day one ö absolute
certainty' (McDonald 1997b). Much of the pastoralists' case for rejecting or
15Cf. Godden (1997, p. 301).
16`Our tribe of Ngarinyin ö maybe 600 people ö belong in that country where those 12
small newcomer families are trying to grow their cattle. These families keep changing
because cattle don't grow enough money for them to stay there. Now the families are
growing their money from tourism. Tourists who want to learn about Ngarinyin culture,
visit our sacred waterholes, photograph our living images in the rocks, our Wandjina. They
are taking tourists to our cultural sites where we are not allowed to go with our visitors,
where we are not allowed to create employment for our young people, where we are not
allowed to grow money for our communities, our people are dying from boredom, despair
and alcohol in reserves.' (Kamali Council 1997)
12 D. Godden
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by the decision.
17
1. Uncertainty over pastoral rights. As far as the High Court majority in
Wik was concerned, there was no uncertainty over pastoral rights (cf. the
postscript to Justice Toohey's judgement quoted above). The rights to
which pastoralists were entitled were exactly those conferred by the
statutory instrument under which a lease was granted, together with any
particular rights or conditions attached to an individual lease. The case is
exactly analogous with any other property right: the formal speci¢cation
of the right determines the entitlements of the right's owner, not what an
individual owner might believe, or might be led to believe, their
entitlements to be.
2. Uncertainty over ownership of additional/residual rights. For the High
Court majority, ownership of rights additional to purely pastoral rights
would depend on the facts of any particular instance. If the exercise of
such additional rights by indigenous people was inconsistent with
pastoralists' rights, then clearly no issue of native title would arise. It
would then be a matter of the state or courts to decide whether or not
these extra-pastoral rights had been conferred on pastoralists (which
would be unlikely since pastoral leases were, by de¢nition, not freehold);
the state retained the rights (e.g. minerals); or the rights had been acquired
by some other person. If native title were consistent with pastoralists'
rights, then clearly native title remained with relevant native title holders.
As with the earlier Mabo decision, most of the uncertainty arising from
Wik was uncertainty for indigenous people, not for non-indigenous
Australians.
3. Co-existing rights. The management of co-existing rights is probably
never easy.
18 But it is improbable that the annihilation of one party's
rights by bequeathing these rights on the other party would lead to an
e¤cient outcome. The solution of such problems is likely to require, unless
it already exists, an institutional structure within which negotiations about
mutually satisfactory uses of co-existing rights may be undertaken. Such
17Similar claims emerged following the Mabo judgement (cf. Godden 1997, pp.
299^300) where claims about uncertainty for non-indigenous Australians were also used as
arguments against that judgement.
18Holt (1995) gave one view of the con£ict over rights of way in England and Wales;
Ramblers' Association (1996) reviewed current campaigns for increasing such access,
including `roaming' where walkers are not con¢ned to de¢ned paths. `Roaming' appears
conceptually similar to some aspects of native title, especially on pastoral leasehold.
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to address immediate problems over co-existence (e.g. deliberate or
inadvertent infringement of pastoral rights or native title) and, in the
longer run, negotiations about how to create an appropriate negotiation
framework within which particular negotiations might occur.
4. Uncertainty about uncertainty. Where there is a lack of information,
e.g. as to who the owners of residual rights may be, it is not di¤cult to
exacerbate uncertainty.
Whether or not uncertainty was actually increased by the Wik decision is
unclear. Even if real, as opposed to synthetic, uncertainty did increase, the
challenge is to resolve the uncertainty recognising all rights, rather than
simply minimising uncertainty by extinguishing rights inconvenient to
powerful interests.
4. Microeconomics of Wik
The economics of potentially co-existing rights of pastoralists and indigenous
Australians in pastoral leasehold land may be depicted as in ¢gure 3. The
entire set of rights associated with pastoral leasehold land is represented by
the horizontal axis in ¢gures 3 (a) and (c). For simplicity, these rights are
represented on a continuous axis. These rights are viewed as either being
pastoral (the percentage of the bundle of rights in land in which the
pastoralist has exclusive interests, read from the left) or indigenous (the
percentage of the bundle of rights in land in which indigenous Australians
have exclusive interests, read from the right). In ¢gure 3(a), the vertical axes
represent the cardinal utility each group obtains from a particular sharing
of these interests; the left axis represents the pastoralist's cardinal utility, and
the right axis represents the cardinal utility of indigenous Australians.
If pastoralist and indigenous rights are `competitive', i.e. they are mutually
exclusive and cannot be exercised jointly, then the situation in ¢gure 3(a)
applies if utility is cardinal and interpersonal comparisons of utility are
possible. The pastoralist's bene¢t from using the land is denoted by `pastoral
value', and is assumed to increase monotonically as the percentage of the
total land rights bundle under pastoralist control increases. Similarly,
indigenous bene¢ts from using the land are denoted by `indigenous value',
and are also assumed to increase monotonically as the percentage of the total
land rights bundle under indigenous control increases. The social bene¢t
from the exercise of rights in land over which there is pastoral leasehold is
represented by the curve `total competitive value', comprising the vertical
summation of the pastoral and indigenous value curves. Social bene¢t is
maximised at point v in ¢gure 3(a). This social maximum occurs irrespective
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pastoral leasehold land. Because `indigenous' uses of land are, by de¢nition,
only able to be undertaken by indigenous people, the absence of formally
recognised native title does not annihilate these uses; such uses may simply
not be able to be exercised. In principle, however, they still exist.
Rejection of cardinal utility and interpersonal utility comparisons prevents
analysis proceeding via ¢gure 3(a). However, interpreting the pastoralist
and indigenous curves depicted in ¢gure 3(a) as ordinal preference functions
enables ¢gure 3(b) to be constructed. In this case, rather than a maximum
utility point being identi¢able, a utility possibilities frontier may be
identi¢ed; all points outside this frontier are infeasible while all points inside
Figure 3 Microeconomics of Wik
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an explicit social welfare function, it is not possible to identify objectively the
social welfare maximising distribution of land rights. A welfare maximum
may, however, still be attainable as a consequence of bargaining between the
parties who value the resource.
Native title uses of land may not be competitive with pastoral uses. For
example, if native title uses involve traditional food gathering and hunting of
native animals, indigenous land uses may be non-rival with pastoral uses
because indigenous uses may not impact on pastoral uses. In this case ö and
for the same pastoral and indigenous value curves as in ¢gure 3(a) ö total
social bene¢t now arises from the super-imposition of the indigenous value
curve on the pastoral value curve (or vice versa) as in ¢gure 3(c). In this case
ö and making the same cardinal and interpersonal utility assumptions as
for ¢gure 3(a) ö social welfare is maximised where both pastoral and
indigenous uses have full access to the total bundle of rights.
Again, if cardinal utility and interpersonal comparisons of utility are
rejected, an ordinalist interpretation of the utility maps in ¢gure 3(c) may be
given as in ¢gure 3(d). In contrast to the ordinal depiction in ¢gure 3(b),
however, the welfare maximum may be identi¢ed in ¢gure 3(d) (point Z)
even without the social welfare function being known or knowable.
The foregoing ignores the nature of traditional indigenous uses of pastoral
land, but has merely assumed that its value increases monotonically with
the proportion of rights. It is likely, however, that indigenous uses are not
simple rival goods. While an individual indigenous user's value may increase
as they gain greater access to their traditional lands, this individual's use is
unlikely to preclude traditional use by others, at least of the same family
group and clan. Use will thus be non-rival, and its total value would
aggregate across users. As well as being non-rival, individual users' uses ö
at least within the customs of the family or clan ö are likely to be
complementary because an individual user's valuation of access to land will
be greater if others of the family or clan also have access compared to a
situation where only the individual has access.
19 Attempts to formally value
indigenous peoples' use of pastoral land, e.g. by contingent valuation, may
therefore need to take account of potentially complex ways in which land
access is valued (but cf. below).
The preceding analysis is couched in terms of strong (i.e. cardinal) or weak
(i.e. ordinal) concepts of utilitarianism because a right is valued via its use
19As also in other societies, e.g. an individual's bene¢t from or enjoyment of religious
observances or football matches may partly be a function of the number of other
participants ö at least, in the case of sporting activities, the presence of like-minded
supporters.
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be approximated by utilitarianism, without too great a violation of reality.
However, some indigenous uses of land, including apparently utilitarian uses
such as hunting and recreation, may also be bound up with ceremonial and
sacred uses which may not be representable in a utilitarian way. Inter-
pretation of the foregoing must proceed within the context of this serious
caveat. It may be necessary, especially with respect to indigenous uses, to
allow for the existence of non-use values (see below).
5. Discovering optimal solutions: institutional issues
5.1 Quantitative estimation
The preceding analysis provides a framework for characterising the optimal
allocation of resources. If this analysis could be made operational, the
optimal allocation of resources for pastoral and indigenous uses might be
discovered. One possible procedure would be to use conventional valuation
methods for pastoral activities, and valuation methods for non-marketed
goods to assess the value of indigenous uses of pastoral land. Such estimates
might be used to determine that allocation of land for pastoral and
traditional indigenous uses which maximised social welfare. Alternatively, if
it were decided to exclude indigenous people from pastoral leasehold land,
valuation estimates might be involved in the determination of appropriate
compensation for indigenous peoples' loss of native title rights.
Estimation of pastoral value is straightforward. Either the net annual
value of produce, or the capital value of the leasehold, could be used to
estimate the value of pastoral activities. In the case of the latter, the existing
lease market determines the current market price for leases and this value
could then be imputed to the entire asset stock. Alternatively, the aggregate
demand for leasehold land could be estimated synthetically (e.g. by
mathematical programming) ö the current asset stock presumably has a
(long run) marginal value of zero ö and the area under this synthetic
demand curve represents the total asset value of pastoral activities.
Contingent valuation might be used to assess indigenous peoples'
willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for the loss of access to pastoral
leases
20 or, correspondingly, to assess their willingness to pay (WTP) for
access either just to those areas to which they have current access or,
additionally, to those areas from which they are currently excluded. Apart
from any other issue, indigenous peoples' WTP for access to valued lands is
20This is a statutory right in WA, SA and the Northern Territory; and a potential native
title right there and elsewhere in Australia.
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low incomes, WTP may substantially under-estimate the value of this access.
Similarly, WTA may under-estimate the true valuation if there is little
substitutability between marketed goods purchased with money income and
traditional land access services.
However, valuation techniques for non-marketed goods may simply be
inappropriate if indigenous peoples' valuation of land access is non-
utilitarian. It may make as little sense to ask an indigenous person their
WTA for the loss of access to traditional living areas from which they derive
ceremonial/religious values as it would be to ask a devout Christian how
much they would need to be compensated in monetary terms to forswear any
practice of their religion. It is not that the estimation is di¤cult ö in the
conventional sense of problems with estimating values in contingent markets




However, even if third party (e.g. economists') estimates of indigenous
peoples' valuations of land are impossible, solutions to land use con£icts are
still feasible. Indigenous and non-indigenous Australians are able to assess
whether or not they are prepared to accept changes in their access to
resources, even if a third party could not in principle quantitatively estimate
the relevant values and trade-o¡s in monetary terms. Indeed, while some
bargains may be made denominated in monetary terms (e.g. some but not all
of the mining bargains listed below), other bargains may simply relate to
types of acts that are permissible, or the times at which acts are permissible
(e.g. where mine over-burden may be dumped). Coasian bargains do not
require the intervention of third parties or the formal estimation of changes
21`While courts and tribunals in the future will have to develop principles for the
assessment of compensation where native title has been extinguished or impaired, its loss
can never be fully expressed in money terms. The centrality of land to culture, to law, to
tradition and to identity is not convertible into cash. Global extinguishment of native title
under pastoral leases remains inherently discriminatory no matter what level of
compensation is o¡ered.' (French 1997)
`The problem lies in trying to equate dollar value to something that can only be valued
otherwise. . . . However, [native title in land] represents more to the traditional occupiers
than a means of livelihood £owing from land use; its much greater worth is in its cultural
and spiritual values. . . . So how can compensation be determined, whether by parliamentary
legislation or court award, for something to which the concept of a dollar value cannot be
applied? . . . [The resolution] must provide fairness with respect to non-dollar aspects
relating to the spirituality of the dispossessed. . . . It will not be easy for us to deal with non-
dollar values.' (Maher 1997)
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feel that both have gained or, at worst, none has lost. While it is possible
to represent the potential trades in a conventional Edgeworth-Bowley box
framework, e.g. with all pastoral rights held by pastoralists and all other
rights held as native title, or some other combination, the demonstration of
the feasibility of this approach does not require such a retreat to
utilitarianism.
The signatories to the Cape York Peninsula Heads of Agreement in 1996
were the Cape York Land Council, the Peninsula Regional Council of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, the Cattlemen's Union,
the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Wilderness Society. The
Agreement recognised original Aboriginal habitation and resulting rights,
recognised pastoral landholders' rights, and recognised signi¢cant `con-
servation and heritage value encompassing environmental, historical and
cultural features' (Cape York Heads of Agreement 1996a). The parties
recognised that `The Heads of Agreement is only the ¢rst step towards a
Regional Agreement under Section 21 of the Commonwealth Native Title
Act' (Cape York Heads of Agreement 1996b). Key points of the Agreement
include (Cape York Heads of Agreement 1996a):
5. All parties are committed to work together to develop a management
regime for ecologically, economically, socially and culturally sustainable
land use on Cape York Peninsula, and to develop harmonious relation-
ships amongst all interests in the area.
9. The Aboriginal people agree to exercise any native title rights in a
way that will not interfere with the rights of pastoralists.
10. Pastoralists agree to continuing rights of access for traditional owners
to pastoral properties for traditional purposes. These rights are:
. right to hunt, ¢sh and camp;
. access to sites of signi¢cance;
. access for ceremonies under traditional law;
. protection and conservation of cultural heritage.
11. These rights shall be attached to the lease title and shall be consistent
with a detailed code of conduct to be developed between pastoralists and
traditional owners.
21. The parties are committed to pursuing agreements with the mining
and tourism industries.
It was no doubt di¤cult to achieve these Heads of Agreement ö the process
began in mid-1993 and took until February 1996 to achieve the agreement
framework ö and will probably not be easy to ¢nalise the process.
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and non-indigenous people include:
22
. an agreement over the Yandicoogina iron ore mine in the Pilbara in
Western Australia between the miner Hamersley Iron (a subsidiary of
RTZ-CRA) and the Gumala Aboriginal Corporation, under which it
is proposed to return $60m to Aboriginal people over 20 years with
employment priority for Aboriginal people and continued access for
areas not used for mining (Woodford 1997b; Hextall 1997b);
. the Murrin Murrin nickel project in Western Australia, the agreement
being the North East Gold¢elds memorandum of understanding
between the miner Anaconda Nickel and the Bibila-Lungutjarra and
Goolburthunoo people, returning $1 million per year over 30 years
plus an employment target of a 20% Aboriginal workforce (Hextall
1997a);
. an agreement between Ross Mining and the Bundjalung people of the
Tabulam area in NSW, for open-cut goldmining on the Timbarra
plateau for a reported $1.3m (Harvey 1997);
. an agreement between AGL and Aboriginal people for a gas pipeline
route in central western NSW (Phelan 1997);
. a series of agreements between the Walpirri people of the Tanami
desert in central western Northern Territory and numerous gold
prospectors and miners, facilitated by the Central Land Council; these
agreements cover approval to prospect (and therefore mine) and
provide monetary returns to the Walpirri people and also give them
the power to approve the speci¢c form of activities such as the location
of mines and waste dumps (e.g. Howitt 1991). These agreements occur
under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern Territory) 1976 which
grants signi¢cantly greater powers to indigenous people than the
NTA.
The Cape York Heads of Agreement does not involve monetary
compensation whereas the mining examples listed do. Not too much should
be read into these di¡erences. First, the Cape York Heads of Agreement is a
framework agreement, not one which involved speci¢c aspects of resource
22The National Native Title Tribunal has an `agreements' page on its Internet Web
site with three agreements listed (`Model for a Regional Agreement between Native
Title Parties and Mining and Exploration Interests in the Kalgoorlie ö Gold¢elds
Region') (http://www.nntt.gov.au/nntt/agrment.nsf/area/homepage). National Native
Title Tribunal (1998) claims that there have been 1244 agreements over native title in
Australia. See also Manning (1997, 1998).
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might be included. Second, while the mining examples do involve monetary
compensation, they are not exclusively monetary. For example, the
Yandicoogina and Murrin Murrin projects involve employment targets
which have social as well as monetary implications, and Walpirri bargains
involve decisions over aspects such as disposal of mine wastes.
The key to a successful bargain is that both parties must have something
to bargain over ö in the sense that both must have something to gain ö
and both parties must have something to bargain with ö in the sense of
both parties having something to withhold to induce the other party to
o¡er or accept an o¡er. Without both parties having something to gain
and withhold, the bargain is illusory.
23 Part of the concern about the
Commonwealth Government's `Amended Wik 10 point plan' was that it
substantially reduced indigenous peoples' capacity to bargain by limiting
their power to withhold. These limitations related both to provisions of the
existing NTA and also pastoral leasehold.
6. The policy process in Wik
In contrast to the delayed response to the earlier Mabo decision, the political
response to Wik was swift.
24 Indeed, it was pre-emptive, since the Deputy
Prime Minister began by criticising the High Court for its tardiness in
delivering its judgement ö provoking a polite slanging match between
politicians and judiciary (e.g. Woodford 1997a; Marr 1997). Pastoral lessees,
particularly in Queensland, demanded total extinguishment of native title
on pastoral leases.
25 The Queensland State President of the National Party
asserted that National Party and/or Queensland parliamentarians' duty to
their constituents required extinguishment of native title; it was unclear as to
whether this duty just related to pastoral leases (Russell 1997). What these
23For example, consider a case where it was determined that native title existed on a
pastoral lease and coexisted with that lease. Further, suppose that there was an important
indigenous site close to where cows normally calved, that use of this site might disturb
calving, and that easy access to the site required traverse over areas which were incompatible
with coexisting native title. The pastoralist has something to gain in discouraging use of
the site during calving, and the native title holders have something to gain by acquiring easy
access to the site. Conversely, both have something to bargain with: the pastoralist can o¡er
easy access and native title holders can o¡er non-disturbance to calving.
24For example, the Commonwealth Attorney-General's advice was available within a
month (Attorney-General 1997).
25See quote from Federal President of National Party (McDonald) above and subtended
footnote with quote from National Farmers' Federation Executive Director (Craik).
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unknown. Even former Federal National Party parliamentary leader Mr Ian
Sinclair thought that the National Farmers' Federation television advert-
isements were `in very poor taste' and `unnecessary' (Sinclair 1997). In
response to this concerted campaign, the Prime Minister said on numerous
occasions: `let me say to the farmers of Australia, ªI won't let you down'''
(e.g. Howard 1997a; Short and Emerson 1997).
26 No similar commitment
was recorded that the government would not let indigenous people down.
27
6.1 Background
The Commonwealth Government's response to the Wik decision cannot be
seen in isolation, since some of the key aspects of this response pre-date the
High Court's decision. In 1996, the then-new Commonwealth Government
proposed a series of changes to the Native Title Act 1993. In particular, these
proposals included (Commonwealth of Australia 1996):
27. . . . It was also assumed that most, if not all, mineral exploration
and prospecting activity would answer this description [`minimal e¡ect' on
native title], so that this activity could be readily excluded from the right
to negotiate process by administrative means. This has not turned out to
be possible under the NTA as currently drafted. It was also not envisaged
that there would be a right to negotiate in relation to exploration and
mining activity on pastoral leases. . . .
28. It is clear that the right to negotiate at the exploration stage is of
limited use because exploration itself is frequently a loss-making activity,
with pro¢ts not £owing until the production stage. . . .
Since indigenous people have been largely excluded from lands with value
for purposes other than mining, limitation of their right to negotiate over
minerals ö whether the royalty value of the minerals or the kinds of
activities that might occur ö e¡ectively removes indigenous peoples' power
to negotiate to obtain signi¢cant returns over land to which they currently
have traditional access. Further, the power to negotiate over the exploration
stage is potentially of key importance to indigenous people since the
26In his address to the nation on 30 November 1997, the Prime Minister referred
continually to `farmers' as being a¡ected by native title under Wik, never once to
`pastoralists' (Howard 1997d). The Prime Minister's ¢nal speech to the House on the
amendments also only referred to `farmers' (Howard 1998a, b).
27Cf. the then Opposition's similar assertions in the wake of the Mabo decision to ensure
the security of land title, where clearly such security excluded native title (Godden 1997,
p. 290).
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signi¢cance may lead to enormous and unwanted pressure to mine these
sites.
The government's determination to restrict indigenous peoples' power to
negotiate over mining may have several sources. One possible source of
government concern is that bargains between indigenous people and miners
are emerging which return signi¢cant monetary gains to indigenous people
(section 5). Wealth acquisition limits governments' power to manipulate
indigenous people; while government professes the desire to make indigenous
people independent of welfare, it may not suit government to have such
groups actually ¢nancially independent and less subject to government
desires.
28
6.2 Response to Wik decision
The Commonwealth Government had obtained legal advice relating to
native title on pastoral leases prior to the Wik decision (Commonwealth of
Australia 1996):
29
24. The Government's advice is that if native title has survived the valid
grant of a pastoral lease, then its blanket legislative extinguishment by the
Commonwealth would probably be regarded as inconsistent with the
principles of the [Racial Discrimination Act]. In addition such extinguish-
ment would, in all likelihood, involve an acquisition of property rights and
thus require the Commonwealth to provide just terms compensation.
Failure to do so could lead to the legislation being held to be invalid. Even
if the Commonwealth legislation provided for just terms compensation
(and it could be of a substantial amount), there are a number of other legal
arguments available to indigenous interests. The ensuing litigation would
pre-empt the certainty sought by the proponents of the legislative
extinguishment option, possibly for a long period.
25. In the circumstances, the Government is of the view that to legislate
to extinguish native title on pastoral leases or to allow the States and
Territories to do so would be seen as inconsistent with its election
commitments.
In the aftermath of Wik, the government sought to achieve a solution which
fell short of `blanket legislative extinguishment' but which would provide
28The current intention of the Northern Territory Government to break up that
Territory's two Land Councils is possibly an analogous case.
29Cf. Forbes (1995) on attenuation of property rights.
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on behalf of his rural constituents (Brough 1997).
30
The Prime Minister's `Amended Wik 10 Point Plan' (Howard 1997b) was
a Sherlock Holmes plan.
31 Nowhere does this plan explicitly acknowledge
the possible existence of native title on pastoral leases. There is no reason
that the ¢rst point of this plan should not have been: `That native title rights
on pastoral leases exist unless they are clearly extinguished by inconsistent
grants of title or inconsistent use'.
32
Of the 20 points and sub-points in the Prime Minister's `Amended Wik
10 Point Plan', nine related to native title on pastoral leases explicitly, seven
related to the NTA generally, and four related to both. Nineteen of these
20 points were directed towards extinguishment or substantial restriction
on native title, and one was a transitional arrangement (table 2). The
`Amended Wik 10 Point Plan' is therefore accurately described, as
indigenous representatives have done, as an `extinguishment' plan, and one
which went much wider than the speci¢c `Wik' issue of native title on
pastoral leases. This plan may fairly be described as one primarily about
distribution, about taking as much as possible from indigenous Australians
and giving as much as possible to (largely non-indigenous) pastoralists
and other Australians.
The `Amended Wik 10 Point Plan' appears to have been developed with
little or no input from indigenous people. Rather, this plan appears to have
been presented to them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Despite having
developed its `Amended Wik 10 Point Plan' in isolation from indigenous
Australians, the government apparently expected indigenous Australians to
30Mr Fischer had rapidly converted his assertion that `the [Wik] bill would contain
ªbucket-loads of extinguishment'' of native title' to `There are bucketfuls of native title to be
obtained onward [sic] by indigenous people, especially with regard to the large tracts of
vacant Crown land' (Brough 1997). But, of course, native title on Crown land was already
available under Mabo and the NTA; no amendments to the 1993 Act were required.
31`ªIs there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?'' ªTo the curious
incident of the dog in the night-time.'' ªThe dog did nothing in the night-time.'' ªThat was
the curious incident,'' remarked Sherlock Holmes.' (Doyle 1981)
32Cf. the preamble to the Native Title Act 1993:
The High Court has:
(a) rejected the doctrine that Australia was terra nullius (land belonging to no-one) at
the time of European settlement; and
(b) held that the common law of Australia recognises a form of native title that re£ects
the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants of Australia, in accordance with their laws and
customs, to their traditional lands; and
(c) held that native title is extinguished by valid government acts that are inconsistent with
the continued existence of native title rights and interests, such as the grant of freehold or
leasehold estates.
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Wik point Ref. E¡ect
1. Validate all uncertain acts/grants on non-vacant Crown Land
between passage of Native Title Act and Wik case.
Wik extinguish
2. Con¢rmation of extinguishment of native title on titles such
as freehold, residential and commercial.
NTA extinguish
Agricultural leases also covered to extent . . . reasonably
said . . . exclusive possession must have been intended.
Wik extinguish
Any current or former pastoral lease conferring exclusive
possession would also be included.
Wik extinguish
3. Impediments to provision of government services in relation
to land on which native title may exist would be removed.
NTA extinguish
4. As provided by Wik decision, pastoral rights would prevail
over native title rights.
Wik extinguish
Farmers allowed to pursue all activities constituting
primary production, including farmstay tourism.
Wik extinguish
Upgrading to freehold would require acquisition of native
title.
Wik extinguish
5. Where registered can demonstrate current physical access to
pastoral lease, continued access legislatively con¢rmed until
native title claim determined.
Wik transitional





. higher registration test, no negotiations on exploration. extinguish
. mining on other `non-exclusive' tenures . . .
compensation taking account of co-existing native title.
extinguish
7. Non-urban vacant Crown land, Aborigines right to negotiate
removed for compulsory acquisition of native title rights for
third party government-type infrastructure; no compensation.
NTA extinguish
Acquisition on non-exclusive tenures, with compensation. Wik extinguish
Similarly, negotiation rights removed for third party urban
land acquisition.
NTA extinguish
. eliminate native title claims a¡ecting management of
national parks or forests.
NTA extinguish
. timber/gravel extraction on pastoral leases authorised. Wik extinguish
8. Governments' powers over all water management and
airspace to be put beyond doubt.
NTA extinguish
9. An overhaul of the native title claims process and the
inclusion of a sunset clause.
NTA extinguish
10. The establishment of a framework to allow voluntary but





Source: derived from Howard (1997b)
Attenuating indigenous property rights 25
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999accept this plan without negotiation. Indeed, the Prime Minister was
adamant that the Plan is itself a compromise ö although indigenous
Australians do not appear to have been parties to this compromise ö and
that further negotiation was both unnecessary and undesirable.
33
The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, who carried the bulk of
the public argument on behalf of the government, quite blatantly spoke to
two di¡erent audiences (Henderson 1997a, b; cf. Howard 1997c). To
pastoralists ö and, implicitly, to Coalition voters £irting with the nascent
Hanson One Nation Party ö the message was that the Commonwealth
Government's decision would provide `bucketloads' of extinguishment of
native title. To the rest of Australia, the message was that there would not be
wholesale extinguishment of native title on leasehold land.
The government's strategy of largely ignoring indigenous Australians in
developing a legislative framework in response to Wik was (and remains) a
high risk strategy. By largely freezing indigenous Australians out of the
policy development process, the government is likely to foster considerable
resentment among indigenous Australians. This resentment will reinforce the
considerable resentment engendered by the government's failure to respond
empathetically to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission's
`Stolen Generations' report, and also by its failure to e¡ectively combat
attacks on the Aboriginal `industry' from within the national government
and outside conservative groups. Unless indigenous Australians feel an
integral part of the policy process ö `own' the process in the current political
jargon ö they are likely to be even more determined to extract tangible
results from the legal process.
Implicitly encouraging indigenous Australians to resort to the legal
process to claim compensation for extinguished native title is unhelpful for
several reasons. First, it encourages adversarial solutions when negotiated
solutions are increasingly emphasised in the legal system. Second, it
emphasises monetary compensation as an objective when it appears that
indigenous Australians are primarily interested in the incidents of native title
rather than a monetary equivalent. Third, depending on the courts' gener-
osity, monetary compensation for extinguished native title may exceed the
monetary value of exclusive possession on pastoral leases. Fourth, the
outcome of the legal process is highly uncertain for government on
taxpayers' behalf, and indigenous Australians; the policy process only
delivered certainty to pastoralists.
33Unless there have been signi¢cant secret and unreported negotiations with indigenous
Australians, the notion of the `Amended Wik 10 Point Plan' as a compromise smacks of
paternalism ö non-indigenous Australians know what is best for indigenous Australians
and thus negotiations can be undertaken on their behalf without their being represented.
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may arise from its policy response to Wik seems to be to change the judges
on the High Court.
34 This is itself a risky strategy since it depends on a new
Court's willingness to overtly reject the precedents of Mabo and Wik, or
covertly overturn these precedents by `distinguishing' future cases from these
precedents. The `stacking the Court' strategy is also risky because individual
judges' decisions, once they have ascended the Court, are not necessarily
predictable from their prior actions or declarations. A subsidiary defence
strategy adopted by the Federal Government for limiting collateral damage
from its Wik policy process ö albeit largely taken for other reasons ö
appears to be to starve indigenous Australians of the funding required to
undertake legal actions. The reduced funding for ATSIC forces indigenous
Australians to make increasingly di¤cult choices between funding for legal
activities and funding for basic services such as housing and infrastructure.
6.3 Implementation
A draft of the proposed legislation was prepared in June 1997 (Wik Task
Force 1997). The Bill was tabled on 4 September 1997 and referred, on the
government's motion, to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title
and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund (House of
Representatives 1997). While passing the House of Representatives, the Bill
failed in the Senate in December 1997. The `sticking points' between the
government and the Senate were (Fischer 1998):
. the right to negotiate ö between native title holders and those holding
other land interests, over the use of land;
. the sunset clause ö a proposed 6-year time limit for lodgment of
native title claims under the NTA;
. subordination of the NTA to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975
(RDA); and
. strengthened threshold test ö conditions that have to apply before a
claim for native title can be accepted for determination.
34`In the wake of recent controversies in Australia, proposals have been made, for the ¢rst
time, that judges should be appointed for a term of years or chosen with the participation
of the people. The retirement from the High Court of Australia of two of the seven Justices
and the pending retirement of the Chief Justice . . . led to a declaration by the Deputy Prime
Minister of Australia, that the Government would appoint ªcapital C conservatives'' to
replace the retirees. . . . in Australia we have not, until now, had such a clear indication that
ideological leaning, rather than professional reputation or intellectual merit, will be the chief
criterion for appointment to judicial o¤ce.' (Kirby 1998)
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the Senate again rejected the government's Bill at the eleventh hour, thus
creating grounds for a double dissolution of Parliament.
35 The bombshell of
the One Nation Party's success in the Queensland election in June 1998
provided the impetus for the government re-assessing its prospects at a double
dissolution election. Negotiations between the government and Senator
Harradine led to the sunset clause being abandoned and a technical
subordination of the NTA to the RDA. Most signi¢cantly, the right to
negotiate was not retained as an inviolate right. The last word on the amended
Act belongs to Senator Harradine who had sought (Harradine 1998, p.4961):
. . . an honourable, fair, just and workable outcome which will
acknowledge and protect the common law native title rights of indigenous
Australians and provide fairness and certainty to farmers and miners.
But, as the senator noted: `I understand the disappointment of indigenous
people that, once again, their rights are to be diminished in order to
overcome a problem not of their making.'
7. Conclusion
The issue of native title in Australia ö originally arising from the 1992 Mabo
decision, and subsequently the Commonwealth Government's Native Title
Act 1993 and the High Court's Wik decision ö a¡ronts many non-
indigenous Australians. The existence of native title forces non-indigenes to
ask how such title still exists ö indeed, how it ever existed in the ¢rst place
ö and why it is recognised by the courts. But native title has been
extinguished for most of Australia's natural resources and, in particular, on
most of the valuable natural resources. Areas where native title has not been
extinguished are generally those of little economic value to non-indigenous
Australians ö most vacant Crown land claimable as native title under the
Mabo decision, and subsequently the Commonwealth Government's Native
Title Act 1993, is desert. Apart from Arnhem Land, much of the land that
has been returned to Aborigines under various forms of title is, at best, semi-
35A double dissolution was not inevitable following the Senate's second rejection of the
Native Title Amendment Bill. This rejection simply provided an opportunity for the
Government to seek dissolution of both houses if it so chose. Whether or not the Bill would
have been enacted following such an election would have depended on whether (a) the
Coalition retained government and won control of the Senate; or (b) a re-elected Coalition
Government without control of the Senate obtained su¤cient seats in the lower house to
force the Bill through a joint sitting. Senator Harradine's (1998, p. 4961) assertion that `The
passage by the Senate of the amended bill will avert the divisive double dissolution race
based election' was incorrect.
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contaminated. Even those pastoral lands the subject of the Wik decision are
relatively low-valued lands. Because arid and pastoral lands were of
relatively low economic value, they were never alienated to non-indigenes.
The issue of native title forces non-indigenes to confront the historical reality
that the most valuable natural resources in Australia were simply
expropriated from their original owners.
This historical reality ought to be disturbing to contemporary micro-
economists, tutored in the centrality ö if not sanctity ö of property rights.
Any remaining native title represents the seriously attenuated vestiges of
property rights originally held by indigenous Australians. The newly-
amended Native Title Act further seriously attenuates the property rights of
indigenous Australians. If property rights may be attenuated without
compensation, then e¤cient resource re-allocation is uncertain. Further,
from a political perspective, if property rights belonging to a particular
group can be highly attenuated ö to the extent of expropriation ö then no
group's or individual's property rights are sacrosanct.
Appendix
Justice Brennan's Summary of Mabo (Wik 1996, per Brennan)
As I held in Mabo [No 2], native title `has its origin in and is given its content by
the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the
indigenous inhabitants of a territory'[74]. Those rights, although ascertained by
reference to traditional laws and customs are enforceable as common law rights.
That is what is meant when it is said that native title is recognised by the common
law[75]. Unless traditional law or custom so requires, native title does not require
any conduct on the part of any person to complete it, nor does it depend for its
existence on any legislative, executive or judicial declaration. The strength of
native title is that it is enforceable by the ordinary courts. Its weakness is that it is
not an estate held from the Crown nor is it protected by the common law as Crown
tenures are protected against impairment by subsequent Crown grant. Native title
is liable to be extinguished by laws enacted by, or with the authority of, the
legislature or by the act of the executive in exercise of powers conferred upon
it[76]. Such laws or acts may be of three kinds: (i) laws or acts which simply
extinguish native title; (ii) laws or acts which create rights in third parties in respect
of a parcel of land subject to native title which are inconsistent with the continued
right to enjoy native title; and (iii) laws or acts by which the Crown acquires full
bene¢cial ownership of land previously subject to native title.
A law or executive act which, though it creates no rights inconsistent with native
title, is said to have the purpose of extinguishing native title, does not have that
e¡ect `unless there be a clear and plain intention to do so'[77]. Such an intention is
not to be collected by enquiry into the state of mind of the legislators or of the
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executive act and of the power supporting it. The test of intention to extinguish is
an objective test.
A law or executive act which creates rights in third parties inconsistent with a
continued right to enjoy native title extinguishes native title to the extent of the
inconsistency, irrespective of the intention of the legislature or the executive and
whether or not the legislature or the executive o¤cer adverted to the existence of
native title[78]. In reference to grants of interests in land by the Governor in
Council, I said in Mabo [No 2][79]:
A Crown grant which vests in the grantee an interest in land which is
inconsistent with the continued right to enjoy a native title in respect of the same
land necessarily extinguishes the native title. The extinguishing of native title
does not depend on the actual intention of the Governor in Council (who may
not have adverted to the rights and interests of the indigenous inhabitants or
their descendants), but on the e¡ect which the grant has on the right to enjoy
the native title.
Third party rights inconsistent with native title can be created by or with the
authority of the legislature in exercise of legislative power but, as the power of
State and Territory legislatures is now con¢ned by the Racial Discrimination Act
1975 (Cth), a State or Territory law made or executive act done since that Act
came into force cannot e¡ect an extinguishment of native title if the law or
executive act would not e¡ect the extinguishment of a title acquired otherwise than
as native title[80]. (Wik, per Brennan)
. . . (several paras down)
In considering whether native title has been extinguished in or over a particular
parcel of land, it is necessary to identify the particular law or act which is said to
e¡ect the extinguishment and to apply the appropriate test to ascertain the e¡ect of
that law or act and whether that e¡ect is inconsistent with the continued right to
enjoy native title. In the present case, it would be erroneous, after identifying the
relevant act as the grant of a pastoral lease under the 1910 Act to inquire whether
the grant of the lease exhibited a clear and plain intention to extinguish native title.
The question is not whether the Governor in Council intended or exhibited an
intention to extinguish native title but whether the right to exclusive possession
conferred by the leases on the pastoral lessees was inconsistent with the continued
right of the holders of native title to enjoy that title.
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